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The following argument offers a sharper micro-foundational lens for studying human 
political and social behavior by demonstrating how political science might better 
incorporate the theory of evolution into its behavioral models, and by showing that 
differential conflict occasionally prevails over the materialist conflicts depicted in much 
of the modern social science literature. I take evolutionary psychology's understanding of 
manifest behavior as a point of departure, and then analyze the manifest behavior in 
terms of judgments, which are binary measurements at a particular point of reference; in 
other words, a given manifest behavior either did or did not occur at a particular point in 
time. I then show that judgments can 1) transmit from one individual to the next, 2) vary 
according to predictable adaptive processes, and 3) are either extinguished or flourish 
 vii 
dependent upon the process of natural selection; judgments, therefore, meet the three 
requirements of evolutionary theory. Judgments, rather than genes, better describe the 
process of human political and social evolution, which becomes especially clear when 
one assesses the consequences of what I term "differential" outcomes in judgments.  
 viii 
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"If we are to create a more humane and peaceful world, we are going to 
have to reconcile these two truths: to find our common humanity and to 




 For my epigraph, I use Verba's well-penned hope, and for my essay, I use an 
approach called 3C Analysis. My goal is to shine new light on the relationship between 
politics and evolution. Herein, I wish to conceptually reexamine our common humanity 
in terms which allow for an easier reconciliation between biology and the social sciences 
than currently suggested by the various disciplines; in doing so, the intransient nature of 
our differences cannot only be understood, but appreciated in a more humane way.  
 The theory of evolution is the parsimonious and true explanation of our common 
humanity, and the insights from this theory can also help us to understand, if never fully 
accept, our individual differences. The relationship between evolution and politics is non-
trivial and indivisible. To paraphrase Richerson and Boyd, nothing about politics makes 
sense outside of evolution.1 Neo-Darwinian evolution allows for a parsimonious lens 
                                                 
1 Original statement: "Nothing about culture makes sense except in light of evolution" because human 
beings are a product of evolution, and both culture and politics are natural extensions of humanity's ever-
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with which to understand the root causes and ultimate consequences of political behavior. 
Evolution destroys the supposed teleology of history, insists on micro-foundational 
mechanics, and demands that one appreciate the weight of history to understand modern 
behavior. Nevertheless, the present incarnation of evolutionary theory within the social 
sciences remains painfully Lamarckian outside of biology and psychology (Pinker, 2009, 
208-210). Recent efforts to tie specific genes to political and social behaviors are helpful 
(e.g. Masters, 2001; McDermott, Tingley, Cowden, Frazzeto, & Johnson, 2009) , but can 
only go so far in a field that is all too aware of the importance of culture and institutions 
in shaping political outcomes (Lichbach & Zuckerman, 2009). The same difficulty is true 
for the leaps from evolutionary psychology to the political arena: we know that the 
political and social environment shapes manifest behavior by acting as an external input, 
which then combines with internal input to trigger psychological mechanisms housed in 
the human mind (Buss, 2011; Confer, Easton, Fleischman, Goetz, Lewis, Perilloux, & 
Buss, 2010). It is the business of evolutionary psychology to understand how the mind 
operates in this fashion, and it is the business of political science to understand the 
political and social environment's role as an external input. Political science has, perhaps, 
a particular burden to explain how the mind attempts to understand coordinated action 
and institutional constraints, and some work has already attempted to sketch the 
theoretical landscape of such an understanding (Masters 1989; Masters 1990; Rubin 
2003; Sagarin and Taylor 2008; Thayer 2004). 
                                                                                                                                                 
evolving state; culture and politics could not have been sustained over time without conferring some sort of 
advantage over not having culture and politics (quote from Richerson and Boyd 2005, 252).  
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 In the following paper, I assume that human evolution and evolutionary 
psychology is true, and then ask a political question: Is conflict, cooperation, or 
consensus more predominant in human political and social behavior? The combination of 
these two seemingly distinct subjects allows me to address Verba's interest in 
understanding both our common humanity and our differences, as well as attempt a 
degree of conciliation between the theories of biological evolution, evolutionary 
psychology, and political science.2 In the process, I introduce a novel way of thinking 
about social behavior, which I refer to as 3C Analysis. At the heart of the approach is the 
use of judgments as an evolutionary unit of analysis at specific points of reference, each 
of which represents a possible manifest behavior. I show how judgments can describe 
manifest behavior in binary terms (either the behavior occurred or did not occur) and then 
show how judgments relate to one another using the terms differential consensus, 
differential conflict, and differential cooperation. Moving forward, I find that conflict 
predominates in human social behavior in regards to the distribution of resources, but that 
differential consensus predominates in both day to day living and how distributional 
conflict manifests itself in delineated political and social environments. Far from trivial, I 
propose that I am offering a novel way of finding our common humanity and accepting 
the source of our differences. With 3C Analysis and Neo-Darwinian theory, we have a 
lens with which we which can appreciate the complexity found throughout the field of 
political science, and yet tether these findings to one of the most fundamental and 
parsimonious truths of the natural world.  
                                                 
2 I borrow the term "conciliation" from E. O. Wilson, 1999. 
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 The development of a holistic theory of evolutionary change in political science 
requires an analytic perspective that responds to two sorts of conflict: first, it must respect 
the conflict over resource distributions described throughout the course of political 
science's long history. Second, it must come to terms with the fact that while 
distributional conflict represents the "man behind the curtain" for most political 
outcomes, political actors frequently argue, compete and strive at a more superficial 
level. In other words, developing an effective theory of evolution that applies to politics 
requires a method of measuring and interpreting the most superficial activities of politics, 
because these activities are both the bulk of political activity and the harbingers of future 
distributional strife.  
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Neo-Darwinian Evolution: Our Common Humanity 
 Conflict over resources is a crucial component of life and society, because better 
access to resources can allow an individual to reproduce more successfully than other 
individuals. In life on earth, there are several hurdles which lead to differences in 
reproductive frequencies, including natural selection and sexual selection; a human 
being's differential reproductive success (ability to navigate the process of selection) 
depends upon the possession of heritable variants that increase or decrease an individual's 
chances of surviving and reproducing (Bowles, 2004, 62; Buss, 2011, 6). Heritable 
variants which grant an individual better access to resources also tend to confer more 
opportunities for reproductive success. Darwin's Galapagos finches, for example, 
developed beaks which allowed for better access to the nuts and seeds of the various 
islands that they inhabited ([1859], 1936). Of course, the finches did not actively choose 
to grow a beak better suited to their environment; over a long period of time, 
environmental pressures whittled away the survival rates of finches whose beaks were ill 
suited to gather the food found on their particular island; the finches who survived and 
reproduced simply had beaks that were better at gathering the seeds found within their 
immediate environmental context. For the successful finches, having beaks well suited to 
their particular food source allowed them to invest less time and energy into gathering 
calories, and expend more time and energy on mating. Thus, finches with higher rates of 
differential success passed on more copies of their genes.  
 In part, microeconomics has done much of the work in conciliating politics and 
evolution, as both feature Malthusian logic concerning population pressure's effects on 
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competition (Bowles, 59), and microeconomic game theory and neo-Darwinian logic 
frequently cross paths in an effort to determine the patterns of behavior most likely to 
succeed in a given environment (Dawkins, [1976] 2006, 39, 69-87; e.g. Axelrod, 1984; 
Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). The choice-theoretic reasoning featured in microeconomic 
analysis helps describe the process of natural selection because any individual that does 
not conform to the rational, utility-maximizing behavior may not survive when 
competing against other individuals that conform to the best-path hypothesis suggested 
by choice-theoretic logic (Tsebelis, 1990, 35-36).  
 William D. Hamilton expanded the notion of "survival of the fittest" to include a 
notion of inclusive fitness, which recognized that our genes are not only passed from 
parents to offspring, but also through other lines of kinship: our brothers and sisters, 
nieces and nephews can all pass on our genes (1964). From a genes' point of view, the 
reproductive success of near relatives can almost be as useful as direct reproduction 
(Dawkins, 88-93). Inclusive fitness helps explain and predict some the most natural 
tendencies found in humanity, including brotherhood, and the appeal of slogans such as 
"family first." Inclusive fitness also provides the first steps towards cooperative behavior, 
patterns which also appear throughout human society. Thus, biological reproduction 
plays a powerful role in shaping cooperative human behavior. Some studies in political 
science have attempted direct connections between either human genes or human ecology 
and political behavior, but these studies are not widespread in the disciplines of 
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economics, politics, or sociology.3 Truthfully, it is quite possible that such work makes 
readers uncomfortable. I personally do not yet feel so far removed from sexism, racism, 
and eugenic policy prescriptions to embrace direct and unmoving ties between genes and 
behavior; indeed, evolutionary psychology teaches that the root causes of the 
consequential and violent 20th century expressions of prejudice might be embedded in 
our implacable natures, and the battles against discrimination will almost certainly need 
to be fought day after day, generation after generation.4 Humanity cannot hope for a 
final, ultimate victory over such tendencies any more than society can definitively win 
the battle against, say, sexual promiscuity, bourgeois capitalism, or eating too many salt-
bathed potato chips. At the same time, a particular gene is rarely (if ever) a sufficient 
cause for a particular behavior, especially not a social behavior (Confer et al., 120).  
 Simply put, we have a common humanity: it is our human nature, and it is neither 
a blank slate nor engraved in stone. In addition, however, humanity features a complex 
artificial environment that goes far beyond the expectations of Hamilton's theory of 
genetic inclusive fitness (e.g. Richerson and Boyd, 35-41). Human society is, in part, a 
product of our very large (and ostensibly useful) brains. We are a very adaptive species, a 
powerful mind allows human beings to occupy nearly every environmental niche on the 
surface of the Earth (129). With the help of a few tools, any given family of humans can 
                                                 
3 McDermott et. al (2009), for example, studies the relationship between a particular gene and higher levels 
of aggression. Thayer & Hudson (2010) argue that  the practice of suicide terrorism cannot occur without 
intersecting with evolutionary motives; thus, Islamic suicide terrorism requires dominance hierarchy 
established in a mate-scarce environment, combined with honor and religious-bound norms of violence. 
4 See Rubin, 2002, 45-46 for the political implications of ethnic conflict from an evolutionary perspective, 
and see Boyd and Richerson, 2005, 100-101 for a brief discussion of the relationship between cultural 
conflict and ethnic conflict. 
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survive in an environment far different from the one in which it was formed. In the 
course of a lifetime, a human being makes many judgments in order to navigate their 
social and political environment. As noted, these decisions are, at their heart, somewhat 
over the distribution of resources. In pursuing an advantageous distribution, human 
beings have a plethora of mental heuristics with which to cope with their environment. 
The mental heuristics are design features which help maximize their host's differential 
reproductive success by navigating through the process of natural selection through deep 
evolutionary time.5  
  
                                                 
5 "The phrase design features is standard shorthand in evolutionary biology for attributes or component 
parts of an adaptation that ahve been forged or "designed" by a past history of natural selection" (Confer et 
al., 2010).  
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Judgments Beyond Genes: Respecting our Differences 
 John Maynard Keynes once noted that "in the long-run, we are all dead," but it is 
also helpful to understand that in the short-run, we all lose: no matter how much we learn, 
how much we plan, how much we sit and think and argue, mistakes are made, and these 
empirically frequent mistakes simply do not conform for the expectations of game theory; 
our minds feature no domain-general area of rationality for problem solving based upon 
contemporary moral and strategic dilemmas, but instead we have pre-programmed 
evolved psychological mechanisms to play the games of the past using (possibly) 
outmoded design features (Confer et al., 114-115). As Elinor Ostrom (2007) and many 
others demonstrate, our emotions, intelligence, psychology, and social context bind our 
attempts at preference-oriented rationality, thereby preventing rationality's short-term 
prevalence.6 Of course, evolution and environment present problems even for seeming-
equilibrium outcomes, for no sooner have we evolved to maximize our utility and 
chances for success within a particular environment than that environment changes, and 
behaviors and social institutions that were once reasonably well suited for maximizing 
our interests now seem hopelessly outdated.7 Fortunately, humanity's genetic ancestors 
evolved into creatures with large, powerful brains which allow us to adapt to a wide 
range of environments, faster and more efficiently than any other living-thing on Earth 
(Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Evolutionary psychology teaches that the mind is best suited 
                                                 
6 As shown empirically in the work of, e.g., Ariely, 2008; Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Khaneman & Tversky, 
1979; Jones, 1999;  McDermott, 2004;  Weyland, 2002, 2009. 
7 Maynard & Price, 1973, and Taylor & Johnson, 1978, make use of a helpful term for thinking about a 
behavior which persists over time: evolutionary stable strategy, or ESS. When more than one ESS persists 
to coordinate an organisms behavior, Thomas, 1985, calls this an Evolutionary Stable Set, or ES Set. For 
more on ES Sets, see Balkenborg & Schlag, 2001. 
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to maximizing the interests of our ancestors, and not ourselves; nevertheless, our own 
imaginative cognitive powers seem to allow for innovations in nearly any aspect of our 
lives, and even the manipulation of the genetic stuff from which we emerged, sliding, 
crawling, living, dying, and reproducing in a process that has taken 3.7 billion years 
(Buss 2011: 20). 
 To help account for the nature of social and political change in individual human 
beings, I boldly suggest a new unit of analysis for thinking about evolutionary processes. 
The unit, which I term a judgment, sidesteps the most immediate causes of a given human 
action, whether it be cultural, physiological, psychological, or rational, and describes how 
one human being's judgments relates to another's in an artificially limited social 
environment. The new unit of analysis maintains a micro-foundational approach by 
analyzing a particular human being at narrowly defined points of reference, the same way 
that rational choice arguments typically examine human beings along particular lines of 
strategic choice.  
 If judgments are an evolutionary unit of analysis, we should find that they neither 
remain static through time, nor are reconceived with each generation. I argue that each 
human being makes his or her own judgments, but that any given judgment is subject to 
an evolutionary process, just like our genes. An evolutionary process is necessary, 
because not all actors will make the right decision at the right time at the right place. A 
behavior that would have passed with flying colors, paid buckets of gold, and provided 
improved access to mates during the Dark Ages may get you thrown in prison in the 21st 
century (Pinker, 2011). Getting thrown in prison, I would suggest, is decidedly not a 
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proven way to gain improved access to mates, or at least not mates with high 
reproductive value. What causes such a drastic and substantive difference in outcomes 
across time? The reason for this drastic difference in outcomes is that the psychological 
tools at our disposal are limited: we carry innate tools that helped our ancestors survive, 
but might not be so useful now. Our minds do the best job they can with sorting through a 
mess of internal and external inputs, but it's a difficult task. Human beings also have 
creative cognitive tendencies to help us, at times, reject the reasoning of others and form 
our own opinions. This process of new and ever-changing judgments and opinions 
follows a distinct evolutionary tract: our judgments are not random, but arise from a 
combination of our biologically-grounded internal inputs, and external inputs from our 
environment, like culture and politics. It is my view that culture and politics do not 
evolve in the Darwinian sense, but that our judgments can and do evolve. Crucially, the 
most successful human judgments frequently, but not always, coincide with higher levels 
of differential reproduction, thereby increasing the number of offspring for individuals 
who hold judgments conducive towards successful genetic reproduction.8  
The word judgment could account for a large number of human activities, but 
here I simply mean judgment in a very clear and specific sense. A judgment forms at a 
single point of reference expressed by the human conscious or unconscious; the reference 
point expresses only two possible options: yes, or no. An individual either approves, 
                                                 
8 The use of "judgment" as an evolutionary unit of analysis is an attempt on my part to generate an original 
contribution, but the argument that non-genetic evolutionary processes can effect genetic differential 
reproduction is not at all original: Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Dawkins [1971] 2006; Gintis 2003; and Boyd 
and Richerson, 2005 all make similar arguments. 
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takes, or  thinks an action, or he or she does not.9 Emotions and rational thought, 
conscious and unconscious behavior, physical action and verbal argument all may be 
analyzed as judgments, complex in sum, but analytically valid as binary: yes or no. A 
judgment is the binary description of manifest behavior, and manifest behavior depends 
on underlying psychological mechanisms, information processing devices housed in the 
brain, in conjunction with the external and internal inputs that trigger their activation.10 I 
have defined judgments in such a way that the number of possible judgments an 
individual could make is probably infinite. For example, one could make a judgment as to 
whether or not judgments are a valid unit of analysis; subsequently, one could make a 
judgment concerning the accuracy of the judgment concerning the validity of judgments; 
such thinking, while mildly interesting, is not particularly useful to political analysis. 
Instead, I would suggest that the frequency of particular judgments falls along a power-
law distribution, in which there are a handful of points of reference that occur with 
extraordinary frequency, a larger number of points which occur with middling frequency, 
and some number of points which hardly occur at all.11 (I would suggest that the 
judgments which occur most frequently in day to day life are those best suited to wrestle 
                                                 
9 The philosopher Robert Solomon, 2003, inspired my decision to use the term "judgment" within a broader 
context, and with reduced legal gravitas. Solomon argues that the term "judgment" ought to be applied to 
describe the variability in human emotional responses to similar stimuli. 
10 I am using the term "manifest behavior" in the same sense that it is used in evolutionary psychology (e.g. 
Buss 2011.) The difference between judgment and manifest behavior is a difference of analytic degrees: a 
judgment, in 3C Analysis, should describe a manifest behavior in binary terms, whereas a manifest 
behavior might be described in broader terms. 
11 For a general discussion of power-law distributions and their frequency in nature, see Pinker 2011, 212-
214. For a technical review of power-law distributions, see Mitzenmache 2003. 
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with the needs of differential reproduction of both genes and judgments, such as 
judgments concerning mate selection and obtaining subsistence.)  
 Judgments could make an effective unit of analysis in the field of political 
science. In any social or political problem, a set of judgments constitutes the particular 
research problem. As an example, I refer to my own empirical work on illicit markets, 
wherein I seek to understand the conditions in which illicit market participants engage in 
political violence. To ask the same question within the framework of 3C Analysis, I can 
ask, "What judgment(s) constitute an illicit market participant's engagement in an act of 
political violence? And what conditions cause those judgments to occur?" The forces 
which shape those judgments represent the traditional approaches of political science: 
culture, institutions, history, and strategic interaction might all contribute to the outcome 
of any particular judgment, but at the same time, all judgments must pass through the 
filter of the mind: evolutionary psychology does not determine outcomes in judgment, 
but it does shape them in meaningful ways, often sharply demarking the limits of what 
the human mind can determine on its own. Typically, a political problem (and its 
accompanying solution) consists of a set of judgments, rather than a single judgment in 
isolation.   
 In most political studies, the term "evolution" is used more often as a metaphor 
than as a scientific theory; its usage typically does not depend upon an explicit argument 
for the three basic requirements of evolutionary processes, each of which must hold for 
the theory of evolution to apply to a given unit of analysis: the three process are first, 
replication (sometimes called heredity or transmission), second, variation, and finally, 
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natural selection (sometimes called differential replication) (Bowles 2004, 61-62). My 
unit of analysis, the judgment, meets all three of these requirements. In my view, it makes 
no sense to speak of evolution in terms of complex political abstractions: concepts such 
as democracy, markets, and war do not evolve over time; instead, the specific manifest 
behaviors commonly attributed to these abstract concepts are either eliminated, 
transmitted, or re-imagined.  
 Natural selection occurs as judgments are weeded out due to their inability to 
meet the present demands of the environment: the selection process can occur at the level 
of the judgment, the individual holding the judgment, or the entire group of individuals 
holding the judgment.  
 The process of variation in judgments occurs as a result of a number of factors. 
For the most part, variation in judgments occurs because individuals evolve in different 
environmental conditions. A judgment concerning the type of clothing one should wear 
will change depending upon local climate conditions combined with cultural context, as 
well as a measure of personal taste. Rational-decision making can play a role, but 
equilibrium outcomes are more likely to model evolutionary outcomes over time, rather 
than resembling a cognitive, short-term process. 
 Can judgments be transmitted, and therefore fulfill the third requirement of 
evolutionary process? If a judgment survives more than one "generation," or goes beyond 
more than one individual, I suggest that there are four possibilities, only one of which 
would qualify a judgment as a useful unit of analysis for studying the evolution of human 
society and politics. First, a judgment might be carried in our genes, and best expressed in 
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terms of evolutionary psychology. 12 In such an instance, the manifest behavior depends 
on the underlying psychological mechanism housed in the brain, in conjunction with the 
internal inputs, including physiological changes brought on through such natural 
occurrences as aging and exhaustion.  
 Second, a judgment might be transmitted supra-genetically, and has been neither 
mutated nor selected out. The transmission process, in this case, might occur due to 
learning, group pressure, or mimesis. It might occur due to formal or informal methods of 
education. Crucially, judgments capture such supra-genetic processes. Unlike genetic 
reproduction, in the case of judgments there is more than one way to transmit the unit of 
selection. The variability of the exact transmission process is a great strength of certain 
judgments, for a single judgment, such as choice of religion (or belief in shadows on the 
wall of a cave), might be brought on through mimesis or coercion. If transmitted as such, 
it is not only conceivable, but quite likely, that the judgments that survive over time are 
those that are paired in stable sets that unconsciously pursue their replication, and are 
simultaneously beneficial to their hosts' capability of genetically reproducing.  
                                                 
12 In this first transmission process, I refer to manifest behaviors in general, and do not imply a particular 
subset of behavior; Tooby & Cosmides (1992), however, sound a related note when describing evoked 
culture, which describes an instance in which variance in outcomes depends upon a variance in between-
group circumstances. In other words, different  environments trigger different "cultural" practices, all of 
which are based upon the universal architecture of the mind. (Confer et al. [2010] concisely summarize 
Tooby & Cosmide (1992), and might be of more use for casual readers.) Not all psychologists fully agree 
with the universalist approach advocated by the evolutionary psychologists (see Nisbett 2003 for inductive 
psychological test of universalist hypotheses; he ultimately turns against the universalists in favor of a 
theory of cultural psychology).  
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 Third, a judgment might be a "spandrel," which is to say it represents a byproduct 
of the first two modes of transmission, and therefore not intentionally passed on.13 In 
genetic evolution, Dawkins points out that our belly buttons are spandrels: they once 
linked us to our mothers via the umbilical cord, but the belly button is merely debris for 
any human being beyond the womb. Similarly, a manifest behavior that appears to be a 
transmitted judgment might be merely a spandrel to judgments that were transmitted from 
one individual to another. 
 Finally, a judgment at a particular point of reference might be replicated by two 
distinct individuals with no relationship, and no true occurrence of transmission. For 
example, two individuals might separately invent the bow and arrow on two different 
continents. Even though their judgments are the same, we would be incorrect to assume 
that one transmitted the judgment to another.  
 The infusion of evolutionary theory into the discipline of political science should 
not overturn the last hundred year's worth of advances in the field. If evolution truly 
encapsulates empirical reality in the fashion I am describing, then the inclusion of a Neo-
Darwinian lens and 3C Analysis should sharpen the focus rather than change the picture: 
the Neo-Darwinian world is already under our fingertips in everything that we research, it 
merely needs to be called upon to highlight the exact nature of our common humanity, 
and the predicted form of our differences. Keeping a hold of evolutionary theory can 
                                                 
13 Gould and Lewonti coined the term spandrel in their 1979 paper. They meant the term as a pejorative 
against what they perceived as tendency among evolutionary biologists to label any given trait or 
characteristic an adaptation, rather than as an unintended consequence of evolution.  
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ground the ultimate explanations of political science in parsimonious terms, even if the 
outcomes are quite complex and intricate.  
 In using judgment as a unit of analysis, I am bypassing some very popular and 
attractive candidates for measuring and describing supra-genetic evolution. I should 
explain why I am avoiding these alternatives. Before even describing the first of these, 
however, I must note that the most impressive failing is their relative uselessness to the 
study of politics. The following approaches have made interesting and productive 
advances to their respective fields, but there is far too great a leap between their 
descriptions of evolutionary processes, and the living, breathing world of human society 
that is of interest to political science. Still, it is essential to review these alternatives 
because the field is both quite divided and quite large, and in my own process of 
generation and research I may have neglected a suitable dance partner; briefly describing 
the alternatives may help others correct my thinking.  
 Perhaps the most commercially popular candidate is the meme, a term which 
Richard Dawkins coined as a co-evolutionary partner for the gene, and a play on the term 
mimesis, which means imitation or mimicry ([1976] 2006, 189-201). Memes, in Dawkin's 
view, are discrete replicators, which means they constitute distinct bits of information 
which are capable of being copied. Just like genes, all memes are subject to the three 
requirements of Neo-Darwinian evolution. Memes are copied from one individual to the 
next through a process of learning; memes vary through both mistakes and intentional 
improvisation; memes, finally, suffer the slings and arrows (as well the blessings) of 
natural selection dependent upon their suitability for the current environment. Distin 
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(2005) tried to flesh out some of the mechanisms of memetic evolution, while other 
scholars, such as Blackmore (1999) or Dennett (1995; 1999) argue for memetic evolution 
at a more substantive level, and applicable in day to day life and technological change. 
The popularity of "internet memes" notwithstanding, however, the concept of memes has 
not taken hold as a unit of analysis for researchers interested in evolutionary processes. 
Richerson and Boyd argue that the concept of memes introduces a false similarity 
between genes and culture. In their view, theories of cultural evolution should not 
necessarily aim for the micro-level, but instead should emphasize the pattern and shape of 
cultural coherence (2005: 80-93). In doing so, they seem inclined to categorize groups of 
cultural rules, and then to model the spread or destruction of these cultural rules 
depending upon their own tendencies and the environment in which they are found.14 It 
seems difficult to determine how much the cultural evolution of Boyd and Richerson 
ontologically differs from that of Richard Dawkins, though the models of social change 
and persistence provide valuable insights into small group conformity, non-genetic 
changes in organizational efficiencies, group conformity, and much more.15 The 
economists Bowles and Gintis have taken the lead in a similar project, though their 
interest in supra-genetic evolution seems rooted in generating a more accurate theory of 
human decision making for economic problems (2006). In doing so, they helpfully 
suggest several new concepts that are of use to economists and political scientists, such as 
                                                 
14 Boyd and Richerson define culture as follows: "Culture is information capable of affecting individuals' 
behavior that they acquire form other members of their species by teaching, imitation, and other forms of 
social transmission" (2005, 6). 
15 See also Richerson and Boyd 1999. 
 19 
the existence of social preferences rather than the preferences expected of a homo 
economicus. Gintis refers to the process of natural selection as differential replication, a 
useful term in light of the manifold ways in which a replicator can spread (2004: 61-62). 
He further describes the many paths through which actors transmit cultural traits, many of 
which can easily be adopted to the judgments of 3C Analysis.  
 Boyd and Richerson, as well the economists Bowles and Gintis, come under 
attack from Steven Pinker, who wants to emphasize the importance of the evolutionary 
and natural basis for human cognition and adaptive mental heuristics, and shies away 
from the notion of culture and cultural rules as a unit of analysis ([1997] 2009, 208-210). 
I agree with Pinker, but at the same time the existence of judgments is too self-evident to 
avoid its use in the study of politics, where behavior manifests itself all too frequently in 
ways that knock against the expectations of a purely biological perspective. Cultural rules 
and genetic behavior are too divorced in the thinking of Boyd and Richerson, as well as 
Bowles and Gintis. I argue that cultural rules are not only in tension with biological 
tendencies, but in a constant play within a single judgment; the external and internal 
inputs to any given manifest behavior are additive in nature.  
  I think there is something else problematic about arguing that theories of supra-
genetic evolutionary units are distinct from evolutionary psychology. The difficulty, it 
seems to me, is that cultural rules are not falsifiable. If the manifest behavior they 
supposedly produce and adjudicate can occur without the cultural rule, then we cannot 
ever be sure that the cultural rule is at work rather than a completely different sufficient 
cause. The concept of judgments, on the other hand, is falsifiable. Recall that a judgment 
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is unit of analysis for manifest behavior. Further, recall that the literature in both biology 
and political science suggests that the pursuit of resources of one kind or another are the 
fundamental cause of manifest behavior. I am arguing that any given manifest behavior is 
also conditioned by other manifest outcomes within a given environment: opposing 
judgments generate different outcomes, ceteris paribus. If I am wrong, then judgments 
are not a good tool for analyzing human social behavior. To put it another way, if 
judgments do not have an impact on one another when all else is held constant, then 
judgments are completely spurious to describing outcomes in manifest behavior. In the 
remainder of this essay, I first offer a handful of terms for describing the relationship of 
one outcome in judgment to another, and then I tackle the issue of whether or not these 
relationships might have any effect on manifest behavior, and how that might be the case.   
 The science of politics seeks to understand coordinated behavior. A natural 
question for a political scientist to ask is how to describe the relationship of one judgment 
to another. I begin with what I call differential consensus, and then look at differential 
conflict and differential cooperation. Based on my definition of judgment, plus my 
definitions of differential consensus, conflict, and cooperation, I then infer that 
differential consensus is more predominant in human behavior than any other sort of 
relationship.16 All of these terms are components of 3C Analysis, which describes the 
                                                 
16 A visual representations of 3C Analysis superficially resembles Georg Simmel's analysis of relationship 
patterns in small groups, but in 3C, the true unit of analysis is not a complete individual, but rather a point 
of reference within that individual, and thus the visualized graph represents the binary outcomes in 
judgments for all of the individuals in a given environment. In contrast, see Simmel [1902]1950, 87-107. 
Simmel's text does not literally graph the dyadic and triadic relationships described therein; for a 
visualization of the basic patterns, see Macionis 2005, 168-169. Simmel emphasizes that manifest behavior 
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relationships among judgments. With each term, I am fundamentally reinterpreting how 
individuals relate to one another, and so it behooves me to emphasize how these terms 
depart from their conventional usage, particularly in the broader political science 
literatures. With each term, I define its precise meaning in 3C Analysis, and then contrast 
it with its significant forbearers.   
DIFFERENTIAL CONSENSUS 
 The first environment I am imagining consists of at least two individuals, each of 
whom holds the same judgment at a given point of reference for manifest behavior. The 
unanimous similarities in judgment provide a definition for differential consensus. The 
term differential consensus does not mean that there is no conflict or tension between two 
individuals, because the unit of analysis is the judgment, rather than the individual. 
Differential consensus simply means that the judgments of the two individuals are in 
agreement at a single, narrowly defined point of reference. The decision-making process 
of the two individuals might be completely different, but 3C Analysis does not take this 
into consideration. Perhaps the first individual's judgment is the sort of rational cognition 
best described through rational choice, and perhaps the other individual's judgment is an 
emotional outcome. 
 My use of the word "consensus" differs somewhat from other uses of the word. I 
narrowly use the phrase differential consensus to describe a particular state of judgments 
within a very limited environment, whereas consensus usually implies a political outcome 
                                                                                                                                                 
of an individual or group is dependent upon who is in the group, and the qualitative characteristics of norms 
and customs.  
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dependent upon a social contract, cultural rules, or as a technical term to describe a type 
of democracy. Whereas McClosky defines consensus as shared beliefs and values 
(quantifiable using survey methods (1964, 363)), I use the phrase differential consensus 
to describe all manifest behaviors in which all the actors within a given environment are 
in agreement; this is not quite the same thing, because not all manifest behaviors have the 
backing of a shared belief or value. As an example, it is possible to have an environment 
in which two individuals both share a belief that smoking is bad for you, but one of the 
individuals smokes anyway. Here we have judgments at two points of reference: the first 
pair of judgments consists of the belief that that smoking is bad, and the second set of 
judgments is the manifest behavior of smoking. In the first set of judgments, we find 
differential consensus, but in the second instance there is no consensus. Differential 
consensus, then, is a more subtle way of looking at the world than offered through 
McClosky's method.  
 Most references to consensus include language akin to McClosky's procedural 
minimum definition, but occasionally include an emphasis on solidarity. Hobbes and 
Rousseau, for example, both pursue social contracts that mitigate conflict. Hobbes' 
system requires a Leviathan-like tyrant to imprint its will on all individuals within a given 
state, thereby preventing the conflict and disharmony that naturally occurs in man due to 
competition, fear, and glory seeking (1994, 76). The Leviathan can impose consensus to 
avoid ideological disagreements (Abizadeh 2011, 304-305; Tuck 1989; Wolin 2006, 230-
245). In Rousseau's system, citizens collectively determine their values through the 
general will, which is a nationalistic giving-over of one's self to the needs of society in 
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the pursuit of the common good. In modern political science, traces of consensus are 
found in modernization theory, as well as approaches that emphasize shared cultural 
values. From Lerner (1958) to Inglehart and Welzel (2005), consensus at specific value 
judgments can occur, and the outcomes of those judgments are dependent upon a rise in 
income levels that fundamentally shifts human preferences. Culturalism, on the other 
hand, suggests that cultural norms mediate uncertainty, which may provide a degree of 
consensus (Ross 2009). Lijphart uses the term "consensus democracy" to describe 
proportional, highly-inclusive political systems with coalition building in the executive 
and legislative branches (1984; 2004).  
 Differential consensus is much narrower than any of these higher-order uses of 
the term consensus; at the same time, my term's caution and specificity heralds an 
opportunity for better empirical work on the concept of consensus in political and social 
life. I will show how frequently I think we can expect differential consensus to occur as a 
part of the human experience after defining differential conflict and differential 
cooperation.  
DIFFERENTIAL CONFLICT 
 A moment ago, I mentioned an imaginary case wherein two individuals are in 
consensus in their belief that smoking is bad for you. Nevertheless, contrary to the 
expressed beliefs, one of the individuals smoked anyway. The actual decision to smoke a 
cigarette might be partly rational, or it might come from a cultural expectation or a 
physiological obligation. For the purposes of 3C Analysis, the cause of the judgment is 
not immediately relevant. In this instance, I wish to describe the situation in which two 
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judgments are dissimilar. Clearly, if the two judgments are polar opposites in manifest 
outcome, I cannot continue to refer to the state as consensus. I would argue that the two 
judgments, each of which is the manifest outcome of a separate individual, are in conflict 
with one another. If two judgments within a given environment are dissimilar in outcome 
at a single point of reference, they are termed differential conflict. As with my use of the 
term differential consensus, my use of the technical term differential conflict only 
imperfectly resembles the way the term conflict appears in much of the social science 
literature.  
 Thomas Hobbes makes no use of the term, but his descriptions of nature and 
society without a social contract seem to readily lend themselves to the concept of 
conflict. In Hobbes' depiction of humanity, all individuals naturally pursue the ends of 
their desires, and in the pursuit of their self-interest they fall into conflict with others. In 
the competition for scarce resources, anarchy must prevail without an enforceable social 
contract; for Hobbes, the state of nature is a state of conflict. Hobbes' argument maintains 
an influential and powerful position within the field of political science, particularly in 
the study of international relations (Wagner, 2007). Marx, however, offers a concept of 
conflict which continues to influence a broad range of studies, including theories of State 
(Carnoy, 1984; Gramsci, 1988) and economic dependency in international systems 
(Cardoso, 2009). Marx, contra Hobbes, argues that the organization of society generates 
conflict rather than reducing it. In Marxist literature, conflict is ever-present due to the 
commodification of human beings into distinct economic roles, thereby re-enforcing 
patterns of narrows self-interest at the expense the proletariat, and repressing a natural 
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human potential for consensus politics (Marx, [1848] 1978). Both Hobbesian and Marxist 
conflict, however, appear over the distributional outcomes of scarce resources. There are 
good evolutionary reasons for conflict to appear over such distributions. Resources are an 
essential if an organism is going to survive long enough to pass on his or her genes to 
their offspring. Evolutionary psychology holds that the same instincts and embedded 
mechanisms which lead to successful reproduction play out in the daily lives of human 
beings, not occasionally, but constantly, so that no part of manifest behavior can occur 
without being pulled through the filters crafted in the deep evolutionary time. As such, it 
makes some sense to develop hypotheses concerning human behavior as if humans are 
perpetually trapped in a competitive strategic environment. Game theory's strong 
purchase in the fields of biological evolution, economics, and political science is due 
largely to its ability to effectively predict the actions of self-interested individual agents 
operating in environments of limited resources.17  
 I argue, nevertheless, that even if the natural world demands distributional 
conflict in the long-run, the short-run might be governed through conflicts that do not 
immediately have to do with resources. 3C Analysis, in conjunction with game theory, 
can describe the outcomes of  distributional conflict, but its strength lies in describing the 
conflicts that occur at points of reference which seem shallow from the perspective of 
evolutionary economics. Differential outcomes in manifest behavior, including ideas and 
values, can directly impact subsequent human behavior. More generally, they are a 
crucial component of human social activity, and profoundly shape our perception of the 
                                                 
17 See Levi, 2009 for a review of rational choice insights into comparative political behavior. 
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world. Variation among judgments between separate individuals provides a critical 
component in the evolution of society and politics; the differences that occur between 
individuals are essential for testing the waters of the environment, allowing individuals to 
discover whether or not a particular behavior is suitable for a particular environment. 
Differential conflict best describes the situation in which two individuals hold different 
judgments at the same point of reference, and provides a powerful building block for 
appreciating the differences between individual human beings, even as these differences 
are the product of a common evolutionary heritage. 
DIFFERENTIAL COOPERATION 
 Differential consensus and differential conflict form the first two descriptive 
building blocks of 3C Analysis. The third and final term is differential cooperation, 
which occurs when at least two individuals make the same judgment at a point of 
reference, but at least one actor makes a different judgment at the same point of 
reference. In 3C Analysis, the occurence of differential cooperation with a given 
environment depends upon the existence of differential conflict within that same 
environment by definition; if all of the individuals are in agreement at a given point of 
reference, then the judgments are in a state of differential consensus rather than 
cooperation. Furthermore, given the binary nature of judgments, any environment 
featuring dissimilarity at a point of reference at and least three actors will include 
differential cooperation. 
 The term differential cooperation is quite distinct from the way cooperation is 
used elsewhere in the social science literature. Boyd and Richerson "use the word 
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cooperation to mean costly behavior performed by one individual that increases the 
payoff of others" (2009, 3283). Their definition of cooperation appears in similar form in 
Bowles and Gintis (2011) and Ostrom (2006), whose studies critique Olson (1971) and 
others for underestimating the human capacity for cooperative behavior. 
 Differential cooperation, on the other hand, does not describe payoffs, but instead 
emphasizes the importance of similarities and differences in behavioral outcomes.  
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The Predominance of Differential Conflict or Cooperation 
 The evolution of human judgments and the analytic tool of 3C Analysis allow 
political science to change the filter at the end of its analytic camera. In my view, 
political science currently has a red  filter over almost all analysis. When a photographer 
uses a red filter, it blocks all of the light reflecting off of the subject except for the light 
which is red. The resulting photograph, if printed in grayscale, shows a high level of 
contrast, but is not necessarily a realistic depiction of the world. At present, the analysis 
of resource conflict dominates political science, a trend that began at least with Hobbes, 
and continues through to the present day. The benefits of a high contrast, red filtered 
understanding of resource conflict are quite clear: if resources play a  major role in 
determining evolutionary outcomes for genes and judgments, then an analysis of conflict 
over said resources should help us understand many political outcomes. A red filtered 
outlook, however, rejects much of the light which reflects off the political world, and a 
failure to understand differential outcomes impedes a more accurate analysis. Deep 
rooted conflicts over resources, such as proletariat and capitalist conflict, might appear 
benign due to high levels of differential cooperation and consensus.  
Part of conflict’s salience in political science stems from its efficacy as a concept. 
The simplicity of the concept of resource conflict lends itself to Pzerworski and Teune’s 
call for parsimony when generating political theory (1982, 22). Additionally, the 
Pzerworski and Teune stress that “the general statements that serve as premises in an 
explanation… must have certain logical properties… these statements must be 
empirically interpretable” (20). I argue that statements concerning open political conflict, 
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particularly war or elections, may assist a researcher in developing premises that are 
empirically interpretable since these conflicts are well documented as critically important 
current events and, later, historical events. Since resource conflict can occur at multiple 
levels, it has a conceptual appeal for micro, macro, idiographic, and nomothetic 
approaches. In contrast, the friendlier concepts of consensus, cooperation, and integration 
are not as easy to get a handle on, and these events may be slower to develop and difficult 
to describe. 
 At first glance, 3C Analysis seems to support the predominance of conflict in 
political behavior.  When looking at small groups featuring differential outcomes at a 
given point of reference, differential conflict seems to predominate. Recall that the 
definitions of differential conflict and cooperation attempt to describe relationships 
among individuals at specific points of judgment; there are a number of interesting 
patterns that follow from these basic definitions, two of which I will briefly describe. The 
definition of differential conflict included an environment in which two individuals 
shared a the same judgment at a particular point of reference, and a third individual 
differed from the first two. If I count the line segments labeled differential conflict, I find 
two, whereas there is only one segment of differential cooperation. If I add another 
individual such that there are two pairs of individuals with similar judgments, I find that 
there are now two segments of differential cooperation, and four segments of differential 
conflict. The pattern is interesting because it suggests a greater amount of differential 
conflict than cooperation, despite the fact that the two sides are even in number. The 
model's pattern holds as long as the number of individuals increases and the sides remain 
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even, such that the difference between the value of differential conflict and differential 
cooperation is equal to the number of individuals in the given environment divided by 
two. If, for example, there are five individuals holding a given judgment at a particular 
point of reference, and there are five other individuals holding the opposite judgment, 
then at that point of reference the level of differential conflict is 25 and the level of 
differential cooperation is 20.  
 In order to model a higher level of differential cooperation than differential 
conflict, the model requires at least four individuals holding the same judgment at a given 
point of reference, and no more than one individual holding the opposite judgment. In 
this example, there are four segments of differential conflict, and six segments of 
cooperation. Differential cooperation, then, can only predominate over differential 
conflict when there is a relatively large majority.  
 Except in extreme and perhaps even unrealistic circumstances, individuals face an 
unlimited number of points of reference along which they can differ or be the same.  A 
cursory look at any society reveals a world in which individuals in the same environment 
tend to have far more points of reference in common than they do different. A 
comparison between a Sophist and Socrates, for example, would reveal a level of 
differential conflict far lower than expected, as both eat and drink the same foods, live in 
the same city, think of the same gods, and question the meaning of justice, with relatively 
minor variation among individuals, at least in terms of proportion of points of reference. 
On the whole, differential consensus seems more predominant (at most points of 
reference) than differential conflict or cooperation in most environments. 
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 Consensus dominates the differential relationship between most individuals, but it 
is likely that some level of differential conflict is unavoidable, and even preferable (from 
an evolutionary perspective) to complete consensus. A predisposition towards a certain 
amount of  differential conflict might encourage individuals to seek new and 
advantageous behaviors that might enhance their success within a given environment. 
The exact level of differential conflict that an individual organism prefers might be 
dependent upon a number of factors, including gender or other physiological attributes. 
Adolescence and generational change, for example, seem to perpetually breed a sort of 
rebellion. I am not here suggesting a full theory of evolutionary bias towards spontaneous 
differential conflict, but I think the idea does present a challenge to the sort of political 
and teleological consensus suggested by Marxism, modernization theory, and even 
advocates of democratic and capitalist norms. Once a norm were universally established, 
it surely would not take long for differential conflict to reappear and reject the present 
"universal truths." A lasting differential consensus is, perhaps, not possible. Even if the 
notion of ideological consensus is desirable from a normative perspective, such a lack of 
diversity cannot be any better for judgments than it is for genes, where the absence of 
biodiversity imperils the continuance of life in periods of environmental stress (Wilson & 
Frances 1988). Indeed, recognizing the diversity of political constructions, paths, and 
institutional outcomes implied by the evolution of genes and judgments shines light on 
Verba's suggestion of a common humanity with serious differences. Dryzek and 
Schlosberg concur (1995, 142), noting that Bernstein's (1983) call for an approach 
beyond "objectivism and relativism" is answered by the Darwinian suggestion of a vast 
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Spurious to Explanation, or Sharper Image?  
 Differential conflict, differential cooperation, and differential consensus might be 
spurious to any true explanation of human social behavior. A good question at this stage 
is whether or not judgments have any influence upon one another. They might not, 
especially given that the outcome of any given judgment might be completely dependent 
upon either internal or external inputs, such as physiological shifts, or a change in the 
proffered incentive structure. I cannot offer what I consider conclusive proof of 
differential conflict and cooperation in the remainder of this essay. Instead, I lean on an 
age-old political metaphor to add color to my highly abstract argument, and I point 
towards other literatures which offer some signs of differential conflict, cooperation, and 
consensus. 
 In an attempt to support the hypothesis that judgments influence one another, and 
therefore might make a true and useful unit of analysis for evolutionary theory, I ask that 
we leap into Plato's cave, a brief but important allegory from Book VII of the Republic. 
The allegory of the cave, for my purposes, demonstrates that it is not unreasonable to 
believe that conflict can occur over differences, and not just resource distributions. I do 
not view this as an appeal to authority, but as an appeal to common sense (though 
certainly not conventional wisdom). In Plato's cave, conflict occurs when an exogenous 
force changes a judgment of one prisoner amongst many, which leads to a level of 
tension and conflict best described as differential conflict. 
 Plato tells the allegory of the cave using the voice of Socrates, who  is attempting 
to explain the nature of education. Education, in Socrates' view, is neither easy nor 
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especially common, for human knowledge is often corrupted through manmade 
distortions. To illustrate the difficulty, Socrates describes a cave in which a number of 
prisoners are bound by both the neck and foot, such that they cannot turn about 
whatsoever. Instead, the prisoners in the cave are forced to stare straight ahead, gazing at 
a series of artifacts, puppets, and shadow puppets. The prisoners face the shadows, and 
they judge that the shadows are not merely representations of reality, but are in fact true; 
the prisoners, Socrates says, have no other recourse to discover how the shadows are cast. 
One of the prisoners, however, is suddenly dragged out of the cave and forced to look at 
the world in the light of the sun. The sun hurts the prisoner's eyes at first, but his eyes 
adjust. Socrates suggests that "at first he'd most easily make out the shadows; and after 
that the phantoms of the human beings and the other things in water; and later, the things 
themselves" (516a). Socrates then argues that if the man returned to the cave, and met 
again with his fellow prisoners, the return trip would not be pleasant, but must end in 
disagreement and the threat of violence. The philosopher asks, "If [the prisoner] once 
more had to compete with those perpetual prisoners in forming judgments about those 
shadows while his vision was still dim... And if they were somehow able to get their 
hands on and kill the man who attempts to release and lead up, wouldn't they kill him?" 
Socrates' companion succinctly replies, "No doubt about it" (517a).  
 What is it that occurs in this allegory? Plato introduces a set of individuals, and 
assigns them a particular judgment: the shadows are reality. Plato then takes one of the 
individuals, and changes his judgment: for this one person, the shadows are no longer 
reality. Plato uses the allegory of the cave in an attempt to illustrate the possibility of 
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sublime education, the elite and rare nature of its acquisition, and the impossibility of 
bringing full enlightenment to the many prisoners who remain in the cave, trapped by 
their own judgment and limited faculties (Bloom 1991, 403). In this essay, I use the 
allegory for meaner matter, as I merely try to illustrate Plato's allegory using 3C 
Analysis. I am not attempting to capture the allegory's full meaning, but simply to assess 
whether or not the values and judgments of one individual matter to any other, and can 
have any impact on social or political life.  
 For the purpose of being explicit, allow me to imagine that there are five prisoners 
at the beginning of the allegory. The five prisoners are in consensus at a given point of 
reference, namely on the authenticity of the shadows. Once one of the prisoners changes 
his judgment, the 3C result is four segments of differential conflict, and six segments of 
differential cooperation.  Socrates then suggests that the four in agreement are prepared to 
kill the holder of the minority viewpoint. The threat of violence, in this instance, is not 
due to resources, but simply different judgments, and I believe that most of our day to 
day conflicts follow this path. Killing the disbeliever certainly seems drastic: after all, it 
is just a difference of opinion. And yet, how often do we find a difference of opinion to 
be essential, to be a point well worth arguing over? How often do families split over 
religion? Over customs at the table? What if one of the presenters here today were to give 
their presentation drunk on alcohol? Would we care? What do we do if someone burns 
the American flag before our eyes? Or denounces God? And how often do our minds 
cope withal to the distribution of resources which inevitably shapes evolutionary 
outcomes for both gene and judgment, and how often do our minds stumble in their 
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attempt, responding to the myriad of calls and demands placed upon us by the ever 
changing environment of the present, for which we are not ready? Please forgive my use 
of rhetorical questions (or do not forgive it, if that is your judgment), but it seems clear 
that a difference in outcomes of manifest behavior matters, in and of itself, regardless of 
whether or not a choice-theoretic explanation might be imagined for a particular 
outcome. There is no correlation between differential conflict and violence, but certain 
pairings of judgments within a given individual leads to violence, regardless of the level 
of distributional conflict; if, for example, a single individual holds a judgment concerning 
religious intolerance, and pairs this with a judgment concerning violence against the out-
group individuals, then violence will always occur against out-group individuals upon 
contact with the intolerant individual.18 Even if natural selection shapes the likelihood of 
any given manifest behavior occurring at any given point in time, the underlying rationale 
for that manifest behavior might or might not be at play in a one off scenario for which 
there is no repetition of the game. Plato's brutally nomothetic cave involves no suggestion 
of repetition, no chance for deep evolutionary time to shape the outcome between the 
prisoners who prefer the shadows, and the prisoner who prefers the light of day.  
  
                                                 
18 This is an absurdly simple rendering of violence, and is only used for the purpose of demonstrating how 
a judgment pairing can logically lead to violent outcomes. As should be clear by now, a myriad of factors 
influence the outcome of a judgment at a particular point of reference, each of which makes a judgment a 
highly conditional and narrowly defined attribute. 
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Conclusion 
 The interweaving of Neo-Darwinian theory and political science should pay large 
dividends in the social sciences. Intuitively, we know that social and political structure 
effect the key three requirements of any evolutionary process: transmission, variation, 
and selection. Most political science literature emphasizes how politics effects the 
distribution of resources within a state or polis, or vice versa. I argue that it seems more 
precise to focus on how political and social structures influence evolution through 
differences rather than resource distributions; surely, a struggle for resources is just 
below the surface of manifest political effects such as conformity and repression, but it is 
the changes and differences in judgment that are most obviously at play in the political 
and social world. I argue that 3C Analysis provides a way to start looking at the political 
and social mechanisms that shape evolutionary outcomes, much in the way looking 
directly at genes allows one to understand the process of genetic evolution through 
something akin to direct observation rather than from a Lamarkian or Mendelian remove.  
 One can accept 3C Analysis and differential conflict without accepting the 
evolution of judgments. 3C Analysis provides a simple way of describing non-
distributional conflict, however rare that might be. On the other hand, one could accept 
evolution of judgments without accepting 3C, since evolution of judgments (or a similar 
unit of analysis) presents a parsimonious foundation for understanding the complexities 
and limits of culture, learning, socialization, and rationality. But I hope that my argument 
persuades other researchers that both the Neo-Darwinian evolution of judgments and 3C 
Analysis are quite useful when used together to specify how human beings evolve in a 
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complex political and social environment; and provide a useful analytic filter for the past 
two centuries of political science research. 
 The goal of the paper is, first, to offer a precise way of studying human 
evolutionary processes between the abstract heights of cultural population modeling and 
the lows of human genetics and, second, to suggest that human natural selection is, in the 
short run, about differences in judgments rather than resource distributions. In suggesting 
the latter, I am perhaps arguing against the vast majority of political science and political 
theory that has developed since the death of Thomas Hobbes.19 The way human beings 
fight over their differences might often find its roots in the distribution of resources, but 
the vast majority of human agents are never fully aware that their conflicts might be 
boiled down to materialism. Our day to day struggles, and therefore our day to day 
cultural, political, and social evolutionary processes are governed by differential 
cooperation and conflict. Our genes, long ago, opened the Pandora's box of culture and 
social behavior, and as a consequence human beings are more likely to consciously fight 
and die for Yaweh, race, and marital fidelity than they are for resources, though we 
should not be surprised if the outcomes of social conflict frequently have, upon closer 
inspection, a severe effect on the resource distributions which play a significant role in 
genetic success.  
 Judgments seem likely to bear ready and low-hanging fruit for theoretical 
analysis. The evolutionary structure of judgments can help account for the path-
dependent nature described by historical institutionalism, and the potential fluidity of 
                                                 
19 I believe Rousseau's Second Discourse (1964) is a notable exception (Meyer 2012).  
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individual judgments accounts for the rapid shifts noticed in approaches that emphasize 
individual decision making. Further, I hope that the study of judgments can help in E. O. 
Wilson's goal of scientific conciliation between disciplines (1999). Though I have 
challenged Boyd, Richerson, Bowles, and Gintis on theoretical grounds, their work 
provides valuable hypotheses concerning macro-evolutionary processes in human 
society. Incorporating 3C Analysis into their programs could yield subtle and precise 
findings that hold more traction with their peers in evolutionary psychology. 
  I want to leave with a normative, rather than scientific thought. Neo-Darwinian 
thought typically describes a somewhat harsh view of reality: if we fail to pass on our 
genes, we represent the first failure in a long line of successes stretching back at least 
three billion years. I do not believe that anyone thinks this way. The decision of a couple 
not to have children does not represent an affront to the dignity of man. Perhaps the 
decision could be explained away as somehow contributing to the survival of other 
members of the species, or perhaps the survival of close relatives, but such a step makes 
us little more than slaves to our genetics, and surely cannot account for the floridity of 
human life. Our ideas, norms, values, and assessments of the world contribute to the 
evolutionary diversity and evolutionary sustainment of the human race, but the 
evolutionary change occurs in judgments as well as genes. In Neo-Darwinian terms, I 
believe it is important to recognize that the transmission of judgments matters. The hours 
in the classroom, behind the pulpit, or speaking to a child one on one are all critical and 
ever-valued aspects of our race, and for a good reason: they contribute not only to our 
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learning, but to our survival, not of our genes, perhaps, but of our judgments which are 
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